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ABSTRACT 
With companies increasingly promoting diversity and inclusion measures, 
how are they ensuring diversity and inclusion within their own leadership 
teams? The landscape for gender diversity within corporate boards is bleak 
and the landscape for racial diversity is worse. Throw in the intersection of 
race and gender and the picture becomes even bleaker.  
In order to combat this corporate governance issue, the U.S. and other 
countries have primarily focused on three regulatory approaches: (1) the 
quota system, (2) the disclosure method, and (3) the comply-or-explain ap-
proach. This paper addresses each approach (internationally and domesti-
cally) to implement greater board diversity for U.S. public corporations, 
while taking into account the unique corporate government of U.S. compa-
nies. Ultimately, this paper proffers a holistic, multi-factorial approach of 
both regulatory and non-regulatory solutions that will likely have the best 
chance to begin establishing long-lasting change.  
INTRODUCTION 
An attorney appointed as the second female judge to the United States Su-
preme Court once said, “Women belong in all places where decisions are 
being made.”1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg continued, “[i]t shouldn’t be that 
women are the exception.”2 When reviewing board demographics of public 
companies in the U.S. and worldwide, women are the exception.3 In 2018, 
the percentage of women on corporate boards of Fortune 100 companies 
peaked at 25%; of that 25%, only 5.8% were women of color.4  
The landscape for racial and ethnic board diversity is equally bleak. The 
same 2018 study shows that only 19.5% of the board seats on Fortune 100 
companies were filled by directors not identifying as white.5 Out of all of the 
 
1 Mary Kate Cary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Experience Shows the Supreme Court Needs More Women, 
U.S. NEWS (May 20, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mary-kate-cary/2009/05/20/ruth-ba-
der-ginsburgs-experience-shows-the-supreme-court-needs-more-women. 
2 Id. 
3 See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, 
AND DIVERSITY 4−5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015); see also DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, 
MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON 
FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 5 (2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/05/missing-pieces-report-the-
2018-board-diversity-census-of-women-and-minorities-on-fortune-500-boards/. 
4 DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 3, at 10. 
5 Id. at 11. 
2
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol24/iss2/7
Do Not Delete 5/13/2021  5:56 PM 
2021] ADVANCING BOARD DIVERSITY 117 
board seats on Fortune 100 companies, only 3.8% of members identified as 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.4% as Latinx, and 11.1% as Black.6  
These board seat percentages are not reflective of the current racial and 
ethnic demographic in the U.S.7 One year after the study, the U.S. Census 
found that over 6% of the population is Asian/Pacific Islander, 18.5.% is 
Latinx, and 13.4% is Black.8    
There are differing schools of thought as to why representation on boards 
matters.9 When viewing the purpose of corporations through the lens of profit 
maximization for shareholders, scholars naturally focus on net profit in-
creases.10 When viewing the purpose of corporations as social vehicles for 
the betterment of society, scholars focus on the moral and ethical grounds for 
expanding diversity.11 While the reasoning for diversity may diverge, the re-
sults lead to the same conclusion: board diversity is necessary and steps must 
be taken for its expansion.12  
Having a more diverse board brings corporate opportunities for more ef-
fectively understanding client pools, expanding the net for talent, incorporat-
ing new ideas and innovations, and increasing returns on sales.13 Socially, 
board diversity propels the “goals of democratizing power and equitable dis-
tributing access to opportunities.”14 
It should not be overlooked that board diversity has expanded significantly 
over the previous decades and many companies have acknowledged the im-
portance of increasing board diversity.15 However, efforts in the U.S. have 
stagnated, and without seriously considering avenues of advancement the 
spark of momentum may extinguish.16 And, in considering these avenues, it 
 
6 Id. 
7 See QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ta-
ble/US/PST045219 (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
8 See id. 
9 Compare Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
855, 859 (2011), with Erica Hersh, Why Diversity Matters: Women on Boards of Directors, HARV. T.H. 
CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (July 21, 2016), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/why-diversity-matters-
women-on-boards-of-directors/. 
10 See Fairfax, supra note 9, at 874. 
11 Id. at 879. 
12 Id. at 884; see also Hersh, supra note 9. 
13 Hersh, supra note 9; Yaron G. Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardroom, 
94 IND. L.J. 146, 147−48 (2019).  
14 DHIR, supra note 3, at 5. 
15 Nili, supra note 13.  
16 Id. at 149−50. 
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is significant to not only consider board diversity through the lens of gender 
but through the lens of race as well.17 
This paper will explore differing approaches (internationally and domes-
tically) to implement greater board diversity for U.S. public corporations. 
Part I provides an overview of three existing regulatory approaches: quota, 
disclosure, and comply-or-explain. Part II will examine the limitations of im-
porting European regulation models for advancing board diversity. Specifi-
cally, it will touch on the differing corporate governance environments, third-
party actor influences, and demographic variations. Finally, Part III will offer 
comprehensive solutions to enhance boardroom diversity through both regu-
latory and non-regulatory means of inclusion. 
In examining the unique corporate environment of U.S. companies, this 
paper proffers that a holistic, multi-factorial approach of both regulatory and 
non-regulatory solutions will likely have the best chance to establish long-
lasting change. To increase boardroom diversity through regulatory means, 
the U.S. (through Congress and the SEC) should lean toward the hybrid 
“comply-or-explain” approach and reform disclosure-based regulations. 
Non-regulatory measures through corporate initiatives and private third-party 
actors will buttress regulations and lay a foundation for enduring change.  
I. Overview of Existing Systems 
In acknowledging the need for board diversity advancement, the U.S. and 
other countries have primarily focused on three regulatory approaches: the 
quota system, the disclosure method, and the comply-or-explain approach.18 
The following sections will address each approach in further detail and ex-
amine current implementations abroad and domestically.  
A. Overview of the Quota System 
The quota system, as its name implies, is the institution of a law or laws 
requiring companies to meet a certain quota of diverse board members.19 The 
most notable and successful implementation of a quota system is in Norway.20 
Corporate governance expert, Aaron A. Dhir, details in his comprehensive 
book, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity:  
 
17 See generally DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 3, at 13 (noting the number of seats 
gained or lost by African American women and Caucasian women from 2016 to 2018). 
18 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 17, 19; Francis Lin, Comply or explain, INQUIRER BUS. (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://business.inquirer.net/227752/comply-or-explain. 
19 DHIR, supra note 3, at 72. 
20 Id. at 17. 
4
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol24/iss2/7
Do Not Delete 5/13/2021  5:56 PM 
2021] ADVANCING BOARD DIVERSITY 119 
With its combination of mandated gender balance and severe sanctions for non-
compliance in the form of forced corporate dissolution, the Norwegian quota 
model represents the boldest assault on traditional market sovereignty. If we 
measure progress by the rapid increase in sheer numbers of women on boards, 
Norway unquestionably leads all other jurisdictions.21  
Norway’s quota laws have been in effect since 2006 and have significantly 
increased the number of women on boards of public companies.22 Norway’s 
quota approach was fairly aggressive and required women to “hold at least 
forty percent of board seats in publicly listed firms with at least nine direc-
tors.”23 If companies do not comply with the quota they must legally dis-
solve.24 Unsurprisingly, each company in Norway has since complied with 
the regulation.25 Though, it should be noted that some companies decided to 
go private in response to the law.26  
The quota system may present an issue known as the “golden skirt.”27 In 
Norway, the “golden skirt” problem was feared to arise from the same pool 
of women being stretched too thin to fill multiple board seats.28 However, in 
practice, this concern has not held much weight, with Norwegian men actu-
ally being more likely to sit on multiple boards and women being more aca-
demically qualified for the positions.29 
 Overall, Norway’s quota system has been viewed as a success for efficient 
board diversity expansion.30 Now, 40.5% of corporate board members in Nor-
way are women, which is the highest rate of women board members in any 
country.31 With such a high success rate, a handful of other countries 
 
21 Id. 
22 See Amanda K. Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender Quotas in Norway 
and Diversity Disclosures in the U.S., 21 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 192, 194, 205 (2016) (reviewing AARON 
A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2015)). 
23 Id. at 194. 
24 Id. at 205. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Konstantina Govotsos, Gender Diversity in Corporate Boards in France: An Analysis (May 2017) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania). 
28 See id. 
29 H.J., The Spread of Gender Quotas for Company Boards, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/03/25/the-spread-of-gender-quotas-for-com-
pany-boards. 
30 See id. 
31 Taylor Fox-Smith, Corporate Governance and Statecraft: The Gender Nexus of Policy, CENTRE FOR 
FEMINIST FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 17, 2018), https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/jour-
nal/2018/3/12/corporate-governance-and-statecraft-the-gender-nexus-of-policy; Albertine d’Hoop-Azar 
et al., Gender Parity on Boards Around the World, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world/.  
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(primarily European) have followed Norway’s lead.32 One U.S. state has at-
tempted to pioneer the quota system.33  
While less bold, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 826 in 2018 
which instituted a mandatory quota of one female director on boards of public 
corporations with executive offices in California.34 After one year, boards 
must have at least two female directors on boards with five or fewer total 
directors or at least three female directors on boards with more than five total 
directors.35 As a result of non-compliance, fines are instituted to the compa-
nies ranging from $100,000 the first year to $300,000 the second year for 
each seat violation.36  
In the two years since this bill was passed, nearly half of new board ap-
pointments for Russell 3000 companies (with executive offices in California) 
have been women.37 This is higher than the national average of 31%.38 How-
ever, 43 companies officially have not met this quota and an additional 300 
companies haven’t disclosed whether or not they have met the quota.39  It is 
too soon to tell how this bill will be enforced, but it has already been chal-
lenged in court twice.40 
The first lawsuit against this bill was brought by a shareholder of a Cali-
fornian corporation arguing that the regulation “infringed on men’s rights.”41 
The case, Creighton Meland, Jr. v. Alex Padilla, alleged constitutional vio-
lations under the 14th amendment equal protection clause.42 The share-
holder’s challenge was dismissed for lack of standing due to no personal 
harm incurred.43  
 
32 H.J., supra note 29. 
33 Howard Dicker et al., Mandated Gender Diversity for California Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/18/mandated-gender-diversity-
for-california-boards/ (noting California’s 2018 legislation requiring that certain corporations have a min-




37 Jeff Green, At Least 43 California Companies Failed to Add Women to Corporate Boards, Despite New 




41 Sara Libby, Sacramento Report: Governor, Legislature Grapple with Pandemic Roles, VOICES OF SAN 
DIEGO (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/govern-legislature-pan-
demic-roles/.  
42 William Ross, Another Lawsuit Seeks to Halt SB 826 – California’s Gender Quota Law for Boards of 
Directors, CAL. LAWS. ASS’N, https://calawyers.org/business-law/another-lawsuit-seeks-to-halt-sb-826-
californias-gender-quota-law-for-boards-of-directors/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2020). 
43 Libby, supra note 41. 
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Currently, one more lawsuit exists challenging this bill.44 The lawsuit, 
brought by the Judicial Watch on behalf of Californian taxpayers, names Cal-
ifornia’s Secretary of State as the defendant for illegally spending taxpayer 
funds.45 The plaintiff cites the equal protection clause for reason of illegal 
expenditure.46 The court found that the plaintiff did, in fact, have standing 
but, as of the publishing of this note, the case has not yet been decided.47 
California lawmakers have continued to lead the way through the passage 
of progressive bill AB 979 in late August of 2020.48 The bill would require 
public companies with headquarters in California to appoint at least one per-
son who self-identifies as “Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, 
Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Na-
tive, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender” by the 
year 2021.49 One month later the governor signed the bill enacting it into Cal-
ifornia law.50  
The bill will likely face similar equal protection challenges in court. The 
same plaintiff who filed suit against California’s gender diversity law has 
already filed suit against this newly enacted law.51 The court has not yet ruled 
if the plaintiff has standing.52 
Other U.S. states, such as Hawaii, New Jersey, and Washington, are be-
ginning to follow California’s lead through the introduction of similar bills.53 
It is likely, though, that these states will stand by while California’s law is 
challenged.54   
 
44 See Keith Bishop & Allen Matkins, Secretary of State Must Answer Legal Challenge to Female Director 
Quota Law, JDSUPRA (June 11, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/secretary-of-state-must-an-
swer-legal-29388/. 
45 Id. 
46 Christopher J. Riley, An Equal Protection Defense of SB 826, CAL. L. REV. BLOG (July 2020), 
http://www.californialawreview.org/equal-protection-defense-sb826/. 
47 See Bishop & Matkins, supra note 44. 
48 See California’s Proposed AB 979 Requires Public Company Boards to Include Racial and Ethnic 
Diversity, FENWICK (July 23, 2020), https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/californias-pro-
posed-ab-979-requires-public-company-boards-to-include-racial-and-ethnic-diversity. 
49 Id. 
50 Michael Thomas & Amy Frenzen, AB 979 Requires California-Based Publicly Held Corporations to 
Diversify Their Boards of Directors, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2020) https://www.natlawreview.com/arti-
cle/ab-979-requires-california-based-publicly-held-corporations-to-diversify-their.  
51 Karen Abesamis et al., California Expands Diversity Requirements for Public Company Boards, 
JDSUPRA (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/california-expands-diversity-83521/.  
52 Id. 
53 Green, supra note 37. 
54 Id. 
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B. Overview of Disclosure  
Board diversity disclosure regulations have been viewed as less invasive 
but also potentially less effective at expanding board diversity.55 Disclosure 
proffers benefits such as “internal self-reflections on the part of the moving 
party that can prompt behavioral change.”56 Moreover, disclosure regulations 
may bring important social issues to the forefront of corporate discussions.57 
Experts also claim that disclosure rules work through “public shaming.”58 In 
actuality, regulating entities often broaden disclosure definitions or underen-
force board diversity rules which decrease the rule’s potency.59  
In 2010, the SEC promulgated its first board diversity disclosure rule.60 
The rule requires companies to state “whether, and if so how, the nominating 
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for di-
rector.”61 Notably, the standards for considering diversity were not defined.62 
As a result, “[c]ompanies’ disclosures on board diversity in reporting under 
our current requirements have generally been vague and have changed little 
since the rule was adopted.”63 There has not been a significant change in com-
pany disclosure and companies may define diversity so broadly as to include 
having lived abroad.64 
Recently, the SEC issued new guidance for the 2010 disclosure rule inter-
pretation.65 The new guidance promotes disclosure of self-reported diversity 
characteristics in both proxy statements and SEC filings.66 The guidance was 
likely updated due to criticism of its previous lack of specificity.67  
 
55 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 17−18. 
56 Id. at 20. 
57 See id. 
58 Teresa Johnson, Disclosure will not solve the lack of diversity on boards, FIN. TIMES (June 8, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a7b76cd4-8850-11e9-b861-54ee436f9768. 
59 See id. 
60 Packel, supra note 22, at 221. 
61 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(vi) (2019). 
62 See id. 
63 Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address, International Corporate Govern-
ance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of Disclosure on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP and 
Sustainability (June 27, 2016). 
64 Id. 
65 Ben Maiden, SEC encourages board diversity disclosure, CORP. SECRETARY (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/compliance/31513/sec-encourages-board-diversity-disclo-
sure. 
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In other developments, the House of Representatives passed a bill that 
would require the disclosure of board diversity for public companies and re-
quire the SEC to report on diversity trends and produce a best practice re-
port.68 A disclosure bill passed by the House may face fewer viable lawsuits 
than a quota bill because of existing securities regulations.69 The House has 
the authority to regulate through securities laws “which are focused on dis-
closure and investor protection.”70 
This bill “would require public companies to publish diversity data on the 
racial, ethnic, and gender composition of their board of directors, nominees 
for the board of directors and executive officers each year.”71 The bill ulti-
mately died in the Senate, but has since been reintroduced in February of 
2021.72 
Illinois has led U.S. state efforts for disclosure laws.73 In 2019, Illinois 
enacted a disclosure requirement for companies headquartered in the state to 
include diversity information (self-reported gender and race) in yearly re-
ports.74 With the information gathered, the University of Illinois will write a 
report and rate representation of the companies.75 The self-identification def-
initions are much more specific in comparison to the SEC’s disclosure stand-
ards which do not include any definition as to what constitutes diversity.76  
C. Overview of Comply-Or-Explain 
The United Kingdom has employed a hybrid approach called “comply-or-
explain” that may be the most reasonable model for the U.S. to follow.77 
Comply-or-explain regimes require companies to comply with the rule (e.g., 
board diversity standards) or explain the reasoning for not complying.78 
 
68 Lori Tripoli, House passes bill requiring disclosure of diversity on corporate boards, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.complianceweek.com/regulatory-policy/house-passes-bill-requir-
ing-disclosure-of-diversity-on-corporate-boards/28084.article. 
69 Packel, supra note 22, at 219−20. 
70 Id. 
71 David Brand, House passes Meeks’ corporate diversity bill, QUEENS DAILY EAGLE (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://queenseagle.com/all/2019/11/20/house-passes-meeks-corporate-diversity-bill. 
72 H.R. 5084: Improving Corporate Governance Through Diversity Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr5084 (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
73 See Anne Sherry, Illinois’ new board diversity law favors disclosure over quotas, WOLTERS KLUWER 
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/securities-regulation-daily/illinois-new-board-di-
versity-law-favors-disclosure-over-quotas/92989/. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Marco Becht, Comply or just explain?, in COMPLY OR EXPLAIN: 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UK 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 11 (Fin. Reporting Council 2012). 
78 See id. at 12. 
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 As Dhir states, “[r]equiring companies to either comply with a rule that 
they consider sociodemographic diversity in composing their boards (and fol-
low other prescribed diversity-related practices) or explain their decision not 
to do so would nudge corporations with a bit more force than the pure disclo-
sure model currently in effect.”79 
II. Limitations of Importing European Models for U.S. Corporate 
Governance 
The goal of this paper is not to disparage the quota or disclosure systems. 
In the simplest terms, if those systems work, they work. The goal of this paper 
is to determine their shortcomings and propose alternative solutions that 
might have a more realistic chance of making a significant change in the U.S. 
corporate governance sphere. With that purpose in mind, this paper will pro-
ceed to lay out the potential issues of applying European-modeled regimes, 
most notably the quota system. 
It is critical to distinguish between European corporate culture and U.S. 
corporate culture to determine its plausibility and effectivity in the United 
States. Three main factors that legislatures have failed to consider when using 
Norway and other European countries as a model are: (1) governance history, 
(2) the role of third-party actors (e.g., proxy advisors and institutional inves-
tors), and (3) demographics.80  
A. Governance History and Corporate Culture 
In translating corporate governance structures, it is critical to consider the 
regulatory and cultural structures in which they function.81 Legislation and 
regulation are not imported in a vacuum.82 In essence, “organizations are em-
bedded in institutional environments,” and therefore, “organizational prac-
tices tend to be responses to or larger reflections of the regulations and struc-
tures of the larger environment.”83  
First, in the U.S., corporate governance is more focused on the rights of 
shareholders, whereas European governance traditionally takes a more 
 
79 DHIR, supra note 3, at 230. 
80 See, e.g., Siri Terjesen et al., Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors Driving 
Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 233, 244 (2015) (describing institutional 
factors influencing corporate governance gender quota legislation); see also Michelle Celarier, The Mys-
terious Private Company Controlling Corporate America, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b16pv90bf0zbj8/the-mysterious-private-companycontrol-
ling-corporate-america (describing the power of proxy advisors in American corporate governance). 
81 DHIR, supra note 3, at 172; Terjesen et al., supra note 80, at 237. 
82 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 172; see also Terjesen et al., supra note 80, at 237. 
83 Terjesen et al., supra note 80, at 237. 
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holistic approach, considering all stakeholders.84 For example, Germany em-
ploys a system known as codetermination that requires employees to be on 
their boards to promote harmony between labor and shareholders.85 Moreo-
ver, European culture is generally more receptive to regulation than culture 
in the U.S.86 Specifically in relation to Nordic corporate governance, regula-
tions are often based on a strong comply-or-explain concept, with a focus on 
transparency.87 
Second, a country’s previous institution and adoption of social welfare 
policies influence how board diversity legislation, such as the quota system, 
will be met and implemented.88 Analysts have concluded, “countries with 
greater family policies, especially as related to maternity benefits, are more 
likely to be aligned with the logic of gender equality and therefore, more 
likely to initiate quota legislation and regulation policies to provide opportu-
nities for women to serve on boards, given their overall country cultural and 
societal values.”89  
For example, the U.S. does not mandate companies to provide parental 
leave.90 In comparison, many European countries offer extensive leave for 
new parents.91 One notable country, Norway, offers over a year of paid pa-
rental leave.92 Countries that have previously embraced social policies are 
traditionally more receptive to social policies, such as a quota system to pro-
mote board diversity.93  
European countries, including Norway, are more left-centric and have en-
acted more social welfare and family-based legislation.94 The shift to a quota-
based approach is less shocking to the system which may be why more pro-
gressive states, such as California, have tried to introduce similar legisla-
tion.95 
 
84 Heidi Hylton Meier & Natalie C. Meier, Corporate Governance: An Examination of U.S. and European 
Models, 9 CORP. BD.: ROLE, DUTIES & COMPOSITION 6, 7−8 (2013). 
85 Id. at 9. 
86 Ari Shapiro, Why Europe Is Willing to Regulate Tech More Than the U.S., NPR (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/02/575168206/why-europe-is-willing-to-regulate-tech-more-than-the-u-s. 
87 Terjesen et al., supra note 80, at 245. 
88 Id. at 237−38. 
89 Id. at 238. 
90 Gretchen Livingston & Deja Thomas, Among 41 countries, only U.S. lacks paid parental leave, PEW 




93 See Nili, supra note 13, at 193. 
94 See generally Livingston & Thomas, supra note 90 (noting that Norway has enacted family based leg-
islation to allow maternal and paternal family leave).  
95 See DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 3, at 29. 
11
Donovan: From the Exception to the Rule: A Realistic Analysis and Approach
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2021
Do Not Delete 5/13/2021  5:56 PM 
126 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIV:ii 
Third, the political sphere in which these institutions exist influence the 
adoption and implementation of board diversity policies.96 Legal issues are 
bound to arise with a quota system; California’s law has already been chal-
lenged constitutionally.97 Due to the backdrop of U.S. corporate governance 
and institutional norms, the quota system may not be the most realistic or 
popular option for change.98  
The quota system is not popular among U.S. directors. Over 80% of direc-
tors (including some female executives) do not support quota legislation.99 
Some women oppose quotas in fear that their qualifications and experience 
will be overlooked and that they will instead be viewed as “tokens” to check 
a box.100 And without a regulatory backdrop for social welfare, new female 
board members may face resentment.101 
B. Role of Third-Party Actors  
Another factor many legislators do not consider when translating Euro-
pean corporate governance policies is the prevalent role of proxy advisors 
and institutional investors in U.S-based public companies.102 The U.S. has a 
rich tradition of proxy advisory and other third-party actors such as institu-
tional investors, especially in relation to board seat recommendations.103  
The role that proxy advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices, Inc. (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co, Inc. (Glass Lewis) have cannot be 
overstated when determining board seats.104 For example, one journalist ob-
served, “[a] recommendation from ISS does not guarantee an activist win, 
but it’s virtually impossible for an activist to win without the recommenda-
tion of ISS.”105  
In a cyclical relationship, proxy advisors have a considerable influence on 
institutional investor votes.106 The role of proxy advisory firms is to “provide 
 
96 See generally Nili, supra note 13, at 193−94 (noting that quotas are an unlikely avenue in the United 
States because they would likely face legal hurdles). 
97 See Green, supra note 37.  
98 See Packel, supra note 22, at 194. 




101 Tyler Winters & Madhuri Jacobs-Sharma, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: The Competing 
Perspectives in the U.S. and the EU, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 35–37 (2016). 




106 David F. Larcker et al., The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 14, 2018), 
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institutional investors with research, data, and recommendations on manage-
ment and shareholder proxy proposals that are voted on at a company’s an-
nual meeting.”107  
The influence of proxy advisors is significant because institutional inves-
tors have significant shareholder voting power.108 In fact, a recent study by 
Broadridge and PricewaterhouseCoopers found that institutional investors 
“own 70% of outstanding shares of publicly traded corporations in the United 
States” with “significantly higher voting participation rates.”109 
On the other hand, proxy advisory “has only recently evolved in European 
markets, and there is no empirical data on the presence or the role of these 
institutions other than anecdotal evidence.”110 The role of institutional inves-
tors across Europe varies more greatly than that of proxy advisors.111 Norway 
has a lower rate of “capital raised from institutional investors” than the rest 
of Europe.112 On the other hand, the United Kingdom is the closest country to 
the United States in terms of institutional investor holdings.113 
A major flaw in comparative governance relating to board diversity initi-
atives is not considering the influence of these actors. The significance of 
these third-party actors is that they present an avenue for board diversity pro-
motion that may be preferable and more effective than quota-legislation for 
corporations.114 For example, importing the quota model from Norway may 
be less effective in the U.S. compared to importing the comply-or-explain 
system used by the United Kingdom due to similarities in the role of third-




107 Proxy Advisory Firms, CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., https://execcomp.org/Issues/Issue/proxy-advisory-firms 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
108 Larcker, supra note 106. 
109 Id. 
110 Nico Lehmann & Joerg-Markus Hitz, Empirical evidence on the role of proxy advisors in European 
capital markets 2 (Göttingen Univ., Working Paper, 2016).  
111 See Francesco Fancello & Nadia Linciano, Institutional Investors’ Shareholdings in Large European 
Non-Financial Listed Companies, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/03/institutional-investors-shareholdings-large-
european-non-financial. 
112 Sigurd Opedal & Wikborg Rein, Private equity in Norway: market and regulatory overview, 
PRACTICAL LAW (Apr. 1, 2013), https://content.next.westlaw.com/9-500-
9675?__lrTS=20200804152553847&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.De-
fault)&firstPage=true. 
113 Compare Fancello & Linciano, supra note 111, with Larcker et al., supra note 106. 
114 See generally Darren Rosenblum & Yaron Nili, Board Diversity by Term Limits?, 71 ALA. L. REV. 
211, 225, 256 (discussing institutional investors’ methods to pressure companies and industries to become 
more diverse, in part relying on natural competition and efforts to avoid formal regulations). 
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C. Demographics  
While it is important to discuss the significance of having a diverse board 
based on gender, it is also important to ensure that women of all races are 
being given the same opportunities for advancement. The number of women 
on boards is low, but the number of non-white women is staggeringly low.115 
Finding an effective means of increasing board diversity means ensuring that 
women of all color are given equal opportunities.  
The demographics between Norway and the U.S. are different.116 Norway 
is mainly Nordic in ethnicity, establishing more homogeneity.117 Only 8.5% 
of the population is not Nordic or not European.118 In contrast, the U.S. de-
mographics are 72.4% White, 12.6% Black, 4.8% Asian, 0.9% Amerindian 
and Alaska native, 0.2% native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, 6.2% “other,” 
and 2.9% two or more races.119 The U.S. is significantly more diverse than 
Norway so more challenges are presented to ensure full representation.120 In 
the U.S., board diversity should be defined to include not only women, as the 
Norway quota did, but also be inclusive of race.  
 While most countries have complex relationships with minority groups, it 
is not a secret that the U.S. has a particularly troubled history.121 In a law 
review article on race and economic implications the author astutely states, 
“the U.S. has some disturbing aspects of its past that are inextricably woven 
into its identity but are largely absent from its conscious memory (e.g., slav-
ery).”122  
In finding a meaningful system to increase board diversity, it is critical to 
consider the historical impacts of racial disparity and the diverse culture that 
creates the United States. Modeling a board diversity system based upon a 
 
115 See DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra note 3 (finding in 2018 that Fortune 100 board seats 
were composed of 25% women and 5.8% minority women). 
116 Compare The World Factbook: United States, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (noting that the U.S. population is 332 million 
people, 72.4% of which is white, and no single denomination of religion as a majority), with Jan Chris-
tensen, Norway, BRITANNICA (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/place/Norway (noting that the 
Norwegian population is 5.4 million people, 83.2% of which are ethnic Norwegian, and more than 80% 
of the population belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran national church). 
117 Christensen, supra note 116.  
118 Norway Population 2020 (Live), WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/coun-
tries/norway-population (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
119 United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/country-resource/united-
states (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
120 Compare Norway Population 2020 (Live), supra note 118, with United States, supra note 119. 
121 See Carlton Waterhouse, Total Recall: Restoring the Public Memory of Enslaved African-Americans 
and the American System of Slavery Through Rectificatory Justice and Reparations, 14 J. GENDER, RACE 
& JUST. 703, 704 (2011).  
122 See id. 
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more homogeneous culture puts the goal of instituting meaningful change at 
risk. The reception of affirmative action in the U.S. is likely reflective of how 
other diversity initiatives, such as a quota system, may be received in the 
corporate sphere. Affirmative action has existed in the U.S. for over fifty 
years.123 However, as recent as this year, affirmative action is still being chal-
lenged in courts.124  
A recent study by Pew Research Center found that up to 73% of Americans 
do not believe colleges should “consider race or ethnicity when making de-
cisions about admissions.”125 This resistance to affirmative action is a critical 
component to consider when advocating for the most feasible means of ex-
panding board diversity as similar governmental initiatives to create diversity 
will likely face similar challenges.  
III. Moving Forward in an American Focused Approach  
A. Government-Based Solutions  
        1. Shifting Toward a Comply-Or-Explain Regime  
An efficient and long-term approach to increasing board diversity should 
begin with effective and clear-cut government regulations to propel the 
movement forward. It is important to consider the environment in which 
these regulations take place. As this paper has discussed, the U.S. has a 
unique corporate culture and legal environment that significantly differs from 
European countries.  
Norway’s corporate governance environment is one of the most dissimilar 
environments from the U.S. corporate governance realm.126 While the quota 
system was successful in Norway, it is not likely to be as successful in the 
U.S. The quota system does not translate well in the U.S. corporate govern-
ance scheme because of U.S. resistance to strict regulatory mandates regard-
ing corporate actions.127 As the California cases and affirmative action cases 
 
123 See Anemona Hartocollis, 50 Years of Affirmative Action: What Went Right, and What It Got Wrong, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/affirmative-action-50-years.html. 
124 See Anemona Hartocollis, The Affirmative Action Battle at Harvard is Not Over, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 
2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/us/affirmative-action-harvard.html. 
125 Nikki Graf, Most Americans say colleges should not consider race or ethnicity in admissions, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/25/most-americans-say-col-
leges-should-not-consider-race-or-ethnicity-in-admissions/.  
126 See Aaron A. Dhir, What Norway Can Teach the U.S. About Getting More Women Into Boardrooms, 
ATLANTIC (May 4, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/what-norway-can-
teach-the-us-about-getting-more-women-into-boardrooms/392195/. 
127 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 229. 
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display, constitutional challenges, primarily in the equal protection realm, are 
rampant for strict government regulations requiring quotas for diversity.128  
Conversely, the United Kingdom has the most similar corporate structure 
to the U.S.129 Therefore, successful board diversity initiatives in the United 
Kingdom will be more likely to translate in the U.S. Specifically, the United 
Kingdom’s comply-or-explain model of diversity disclosure would be an ef-
fective hybrid system between the quota and disclosure approach.  
The idea of comply-or-explain regulation is not new to the U.S.130 The U.S. 
has adopted comply-or-explain rules before; in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, companies must report if their board has at least one financial expert 
on the audit committee.131 If they do not they must explain.132 The significance 
of this is that it would not be a radical change to the corporate governance 
sphere to include a comply-or-explain system for board diversity. Moreover, 
a comply-or-explain regime would allow corporations flexibility to explain 
for not meeting diversity standards, while promoting positive publicity for 
complying.  
Further supplementing a comply-or-explain act should be expert reports 
and recommendations for companies not meeting standards, such as the state 
of Illinois has enacted.133 The University of Illinois writes detailed reports on 
companies that do not provide sufficient board representation.134 This report 
not only provides an analysis of current diversity standards but also finds 
detailed and workable recommendations for corporations.135 
        2. Reforming Current Disclosure Regulations 
Perhaps the best way to increase board diversity is by defining diversity 
meaningfully. The SEC has not explicitly defined the term “diversity.”136 
Companies are then able to interpret diversity to include “differences of 
viewpoint, professional experience, [and] education.”137 While it is a good 
 
128 See e.g., Green, supra note 37 (discussing legal challenges to California’s mandatory quota for women 
on corporate boards); Anemona Hartocollis, supra note 124. 
129 See Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 891, 934−35 (2006). 
130 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 241. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 Sherry, supra note 73. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Tamara S. Smallman, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’S Role in Cracking the Door Open So Women 
May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 812 (2013). 
137 Id. at 812−13. 
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goal to have diversity of thought and experience, by defining diversity so 
broadly, nearly anyone could fit into that category.138  
By creating such a broad interpretation, the definition loses its meaning 
and the chance to create meaningful change.139 Dhir states this dilemma best 
by writing, “[w]hile other forms of diversity may be underrepresented in or-
ganizations, the historical causes informing this exclusion are likely to differ 
from those that have caused demographic underrepresentation, and even the 
causes for the exclusion of varying forms of sociodemographic difference 
will not be the same.”140Additionally problematic, a corporation may choose 
to not even disclose information to the SEC.141  
The disclosure system is effective in its ability to potentially shame com-
panies into increasing board diversity and it is more realistic for implemen-
tation within the U.S. corporate governance sphere.142 However, concerns 
have been raised about its lax implementation which allows for broad defini-
tions thus not making space specifically for women of color.143 In other 
words, “broadening the definition of diversity has allowed boards to claim 
inroads regarding experience-based diversity at the expense of demographic 
diversity.”144 Additionally, the disclosure system by itself may not be effec-
tive enough to enact meaningful change in a way that a more holistic com-
mitment may.145 While disclosure systems are a good start, corporate culture 
itself must make changes to ensure long-lasting change and inclusive poli-
cies.  
B. Using America’s Resistance to Regulation to Apply Non-Regulatory 
Change  
       1. Expanding the Recruitment Lens  
For companies wanting to make meaningful change, expanding the lens of 
recruitment is essential to avoid the “golden skirt” issue and to find enough 
qualified board members. It is a common trope in the business community 
that to be on a board, one needs to already be a board member.146 Seeing that 
 
138 Id. at 813. 
139 Id. at 840. 
140 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 232. 
141 Smallman, supra note 136, at 836. 
142 See DHIR, supra note 3, at 86. 
143 Marta Geletkanycz et al., Research: When Boards Broaden Their Definition of Diversity, Women and 
People of Color Lose Out, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/research-when-
boards-broaden-their-definition-of-diversity-women-and-people-of-color-lose-out. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
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low board representation stretches back decades, selecting board members 
who are already on other boards will not alone create meaningful change. 
Additionally, low CEO diversity representation exists.147 Of all of the Fortune 
500 organizations, only 6.4% of CEOs are women.148 Therefore, when boards 
only look for previous board members or executive positions, the lens ex-
cludes many talented and qualified candidates.149  
Rather than viewing a wider lens as selecting potential members that have 
less experience, companies may view this as an opportunity to invigorate 
boards with new perspectives and leadership qualities found elsewhere.150 
One executive search firm, Toft Group, suggests that the recruitment pool be 
widened to be “one that is less about prior CEO or Board experience; but 
rather focused on achievements, aptitude, network connections, and personal 
experience.”151 The firm suggests that companies widen the lens to consider 
leadership in operations, finance, and research and development company 
departments.152  
In order to achieve true diversity, networking and social circles need to be 
expanded so connecting people should be a focus on management.153 It is up 
to those who already hold board positions and management positions to be 
aware of opportunities to expand networking circles and spark the conversa-
tion.154  
Additionally, it is important for women and minorities to be strategic with 
networking which may feel unnatural for some.155 Experts suggest that 
women who feel uncomfortable with networking view it as an opportunity to 
provide their own value to someone else rather than only receiving benefits.156 
While not in the explicit realm of corporate governance, joining networking 
groups, such as The American College of Corporate Directors, the National 
 
147 Lisa D. Ellis, How Networking Can Help Women Secure Board Seats, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. 
HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/networking-help-women-board-seats/ (last visited Nov. 1, 
2020) (noting the lack of diversity in the CEO context). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Recruiting for a Diverse and Qualified Board, TOFTGROUP, https://thetoftgroup.com/board-search/ 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 See Betty Liu, The Secret to Making Boards More Diverse: Better Networking, BARRON’S (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/diverse-boards-make-better-companies-so-the-nyse-is-taking-
action-51580927401. 
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Association of Corporate Directors, and Women Corporate Directors, may 
help broaden networking opportunities.157 
       2. Promote Training and Mentorship Programs  
 In order to have enough qualified board members, more training and lead-
ership opportunities should be provided to diverse candidates lower down the 
corporate ladder. Moreover, employees and managers should be trained 
about bias and cultivate an inclusive environment.  
In order for a diversity program to be successful, however, care must be 
taken to establish quality programs and ensure managers are on board.158 
Studies have found that voluntary programs, rather than top-down mandatory 
programs, may yield better results.159 Social pressures and accountability in-
crease management attendance as managers see themselves as helping rather 
than being punished.160 
Mentorship programs and college recruitment programs have shown won-
derfully positive results.161 Voluntary programs allow the most willing and 
passionate employees to create positive change in their company.162 Statisti-
cally, mentorship programs have been shown to boost representation of mi-
nority groups from 9% to 24%.163 
A case study of Coca-Cola shows the positive effects over time that men-
toring programs have displayed.164 After being sued for discrimination, the 
court-mandated a mentorship program at Coca-Cola.165 A specialized task 
force helped the company construct measurable goals to recruit more diverse 
candidates and enlisted the help of leaders at all levels in the company.166  
After only five years, “80% of mentees had climbed at least one rung in man-
agement.”167   
 
157 Id. 
158 Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. 
161 Id. 
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C. Using the Role of Third-Party Actors to Implement Lasting Policies  
Rather than feeling discouraged by the barrier third-party actors present in 
regulating the corporate sector, supporters of board diversity should put the 
onus on these institutions to create meaningful change. Additionally, third-
party actors should be considered as a factor in drafting legislation and in rule 
promulgation.   
       1. Search Firms  
Search firms should seek diverse candidates by expanding their lens and 
circles.168 Additionally, companies should select recruitment firms that prior-
itize diversity as a qualification.169 To use a current example, Goldman Sachs 
has made it a priority to find a search firm to help clients create more board 
diversity.170  
In fact, Goldman Sachs has stated that it will not take a company public 
without a diverse board.171 While the investment bank did not define diversity 
and only requires one diverse member, this example highlights the influence 
that third-party actors may play.172 The role of Goldman Sachs also highlights 
the roles of other institutions, such as underwriters in promoting board diver-
sity.  
       2. Proxy Advisory Firms 
Many proxy advisory firms do have diversity policies. ISS’ updated 2020 
Proxy Voting Guidelines state: “For companies in the Russel 300 or S&P 
1500 indices, generally voting against or withhold from the chair of the nom-
inating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies 
where there are no women on the company’s board.”173 While on its face this 
policy seems like a step in the right direction, it goes on to list mitigating 
factors, with one being “relevant factors as applicable.”174 
 
168 See Crystal Kim, Goldman to Hire Search Firm to Help IPO’s Board Diversity, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/goldman-is-said-to-tap-search-firm-to-
aid-ipos-board-diversity. 
169 See id. 
170 Id. 
171 Kim Elsesser, Goldman Sachs Won’t Take Companies Public if They Have All-Male Corporate Boards, 
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2020/01/23/goldman-sachs-wont-
take-companies-public-if-they-have-all-male-corporate-boards/#5dda5a2f9475. 
172 Id. 
173 INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., AMERICAS: PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES UPDATES FOR 2020, at 6 
(2019),  https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/updates/Americas-Policy-Updates.pdf.  
174 Id. 
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Pressure should be put on proxy advisory firms to create more firm guide-
lines, perhaps with added regulation by the SEC. Recently, the SEC promul-
gated a “warning for proxy advisers that they must convey correct infor-
mation to shareholders.”175 This rule was challenged in court and the case has 
been stayed.176 When a ruling on this case is announced, it will likely impact 
the scope in which the SEC may promulgate rules for proxy advisors in the 
future, such as rules promoting diversity.177  
        3. Institutional Investors  
Adding to this complex relationship is the role of institutional investors 
such as BlackRock, Vanguard Group, and State Street Corp, which are huge 
clients of proxy advisory firms.178 Institutional investors have already con-
tributed positively to increased board diversity, with State Street leading the 
way.179 In 2017, State Street began a “Fearless Girl” campaign to increase 
board diversity.180  
As the initiative, “State Street will vote against the entire slate of board 
members on the nominating committee of any company not meeting its gen-
der diversity criteria.”181 Since this policy was enacted, 681 companies have 
added board members who are women.182 In order to continue this momen-




175 Cezary Podkul, Proxy Advisory Firm Sues SEC Over New Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2019),  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisory-firm-sues-sec-over-new-rules-11572600608. 
176 Nicolas Grabar et al., The SEC Takes Action on Proxy Advisory Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/19/the-sec-takes-action-on-
proxy-advisory-firms/ (“The action was stayed pending action on the Proposal, and ISS will now need to 
decide whether to pursue it.”). 
177 Steven Friedman, The Basis for ISS’ Lawsuit Against the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 31, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/05/the-basis-for-iss-lawsuit-
against-the-sec/. 
178 Celarier, supra note 80.     
179 Subodh Mishra, U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 
18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/u-s-board-diversity-trends-in-2019/. 




182 State Street Global Advisors Marks Third Anniversary and Progress of Fearless Girl Campaign, Re-
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CONCLUSION 
Using the analysis of the different qualities that create American corporate 
governance, we may uncover the most effective means for positive change 
that may be more feasible in the corporate sphere. A collaborative effort be-
tween the government and corporations has the best chance for successful 
board diversity improvements. Congressional legislation and administrative 
rules for corporations and third-party actors can best propel the movement 
forward while companies can take individual steps to cement the progress.  
The key to moving forward is encompassing a holistic, multi-factorial ap-
proach that takes into consideration the unique challenges that American cor-
porate governance presents with a focus on long-term institutional change. 
“Real change,” Justice Ginsburg also remarked, “enduring change, happens 
one step at a time.”183 
 
183 RBG’s iconic quotes on law, love and the fight for equality, CBS NEWS (Sept. 19, 2020), 
https://wtop.com/supreme-court/2020/09/rbgs-iconic-quotes-on-law-love-and-the-fight-for-equality/. 
22
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol24/iss2/7
